党课无神论六篇

时间:2022-05-09 16:50:04  来源:网友投稿

党课,是中国共产党的组织对党员和入党积极分子进行教育而开的课。党的各级组织,通过党课定期向党员和入党积极分子宣传党的路线、方针、政策;进行党性、党纪和党的基本知识教育。党课是每一名共产党员的必修课,是严格党的组织生活制度的重要方面, 以下是为大家整理的关于党课无神论6篇 , 供大家参考选择。

党课无神论6篇

党课无神论篇1

《无神论的灵性小书》读后感

《无神论的灵性小书》读后感
毕业于发过高等师范学校的安德瑞·孔德·斯朋维勒是一名唯物主义哲学家,他不相信这个世界上存在神,他在这本书中,明确的提出了,这个世界是由物质决定的。与马克思唯物主义观一样,认为物质组成了这个世界,但是与马克思的观点不同的是,他认为宗教还是有可取之处的,只是不相信上帝的存在。
安德瑞在书中给我阐述了宗教给我们生活带来的好处,比如可以带来一种人类社会不可或缺的团结干。在国外中,因为有了相同的信仰——***,他们懂得诚实比虚伪重要,勇敢比懦弱重要,慷慨比自私重要。但是如果没有神的存在,人们就要不相信这些吗?难道这些道理就会颠倒过来吗?所以,在书中,他提出了人可以没有信仰,但不能没有对生活的真诚与虔诚。
信仰是正对有神论而言的,而虔诚是对生活中某种价值的认同和承担,在西方有很多人都是无神论者,但是他们认同生活中某种价值观,以其为自身行动的标准他们也做到了中国古代所说的“有所畏”,对爱和正义充满了热忱和担当。
现在中国出现了越来越多的道德缺失,甚至败坏的现象。有人则说,我们中国人没有信仰。只有信仰才能让我们回到健康的道德状态。但是,真的有了信仰就会做到道德不缺失吗?于我看来,不一定。
1
信仰仅仅是给了我们心中一种寄托,但是在物质条件没有得到一定满足的时候,这些所谓的寄托对于大多人而言,是没有现实意义的。所以,在当前的中国,保证大家的生活水平就是给我们心中寻找信仰,大家都不因买房,买车等烦恼时,谁还会去想着犯罪?那个时候,充实自身的精神世界才是我们所追求的。
在书中,作者还提到了,人类在没有宗教信仰也可以享有灵性的生活,而这种灵性的生活是人类面对宇宙的无垠、自然的崇高所升起的那种莫名所以、超乎语言之外的感受。比如佛教徒在冥想的时候,都能感受到的那种超乎个人存在的、对无限的接近。
在高三的时候,我就有过这种类似的经历,因为学习的压力过重,我在每天晚上睡觉之前,都会什么都不想,躺在床上,慢慢的控制呼吸,让呼吸变慢,想象自身变的十分轻盈。那个时候,会有种莫名的感觉,感觉你要脱离这个世界一样,身体说不出的轻松,大脑却无比的清醒。
生活中,当我们对某些价值观认同的时候,不妨以其为我们日后行为的准则之一,相信这个世界上还是有神圣事物的存在,帮助他人并不是要炒作,行善并不是为了提高自身的名声。那时你也许会感觉到一种面朝大海,春暖花开的惬意。

党课无神论篇2

抓研究,求实效,深入持久地开展无神论教育

永吉县教科研

一、抓科研,充分发挥导向作用

“中小学无神论教育”研究,是在教科所立项研究实验的基础上在全县由点到面系统开展的。全面开展教 育是在实验的基础上进行的。为了抓好第一手资料,开展研究,我们进行了各种形式的调查,一是在实验校进 行了问卷调查,各实验单位基本都写了调查报告;二是总课题组对全县宗教的发展和封建迷信活动作了大量详 尽的调查。我县现有天主教、***、佛教、伊斯兰教等四种宗教,信徒约1.2万人, 各类宗教活动场所及家 庭活动点近百处。以***为例,1990年活动场所全县不足10处,信徒不足800人,1994年已发展到活动点80余 处, 信徒近8000人。在暂短的四年时间里,活动场所和信教人数分别增长了7倍和9倍。除了调查全县宗教发展 外,并掌握了其活动情况,尤其是非法的地下活动,如非法的秘密集会,自封传道人的流窜活动;又如信教群 众由妇女向男人发展,向低龄人发展等等。在此基础上,我们召开了阶段总结会,对第一手材料进行分析、研 究和制定教育措施。在实验研究过程中,我们不断深入基层,调查课题研究进展情况,以随时纠正方案,调整 措施,使研究不断深入,指导教育工作顺利地向前发展。

二、抓全员,充分发挥调控作用

抓全员就是充分发挥实验校的教育行政职能作用,把无神论教育的研究纳入议事日程,使其成为德育的重 要组成部分,使全体教育工作者高度重视,全员参与,建立和完善无神论教育工作的高效运行机制。

1.强化队伍建设,形成全员育人格局

在队伍建设中,形成“三线”研究育人格局,即校长——主任——班主任——科任的行政线,党支部—— 工会——团队的党群线和后勤工作的服务线,各自发挥作用,齐抓共管,形成无神论教育网络。

2.明确任务,落实责任

对于实验校,我们明确实验步骤、任务,进行跟踪指导,及时进行阶段总结,各实验校也制定了实验方案 和教育目标,明确了各自职责,使研究和教育落到了实处,并收到了较好的效果。

3.抓好典型,扩大成果

1994年3月开题以来,由开始的20几个实验单位, 推向全县中小学。增强了教育的实效性和研究的可操作 性。全县召开了1 次开题论证会,5次骨干人员培训班,5次阶段总结会,4次专题研讨会, 一次观摩现场即经 验交流会,征集了调查报告34篇,论文53篇,编印了《科学无神论课题研究》材料汇编一、二集。

五里河镇是一个半山区的大镇,有5万多人口, 这里的群众信教发展很快,封建迷信活动也较猖獗。我们 以这个镇作为实验单位,教育办主任亲自挂帅,编写了“无神论教育例话”,用本镇的真实事例,宣传有神论 和封建活动的危害,宣传马克思主义唯物论,收到较好的效果。

乌拉街镇是满族的发祥地,信仰萨满教较严重,甚至有的教师也参与了宗教活动。这个乡镇由德育视导员 亲自抓无神论教育,把此项工作纳入目标管理之中,设一票否决,各校把此事当做大事来抓,出现了学生动员 家长退教,一些入教的群众不参与宗教活动,入教的教师也退出了活动。为了扩大成果,我们在这两个乡镇召 开了现场会,“无神论教育”研讨会,使全县的无神论教育活动有了新的发展,有了新的成果。

三、抓全方位,充分发挥协调作用

抓全方位,就是努力创造各种条件,发挥学校、家庭、社会合力的教育功能,通过有效的协调动作,使学 校教育得到社会参与,主要体现在以下几个方面:

1.优化环境,营造氛围

有神论的影响和封建迷信活动,主要来自于社会的“大气候”。要净化学校的小环境,仅依靠小环境的氛 围显见力单势薄,必须营造大氛围,使学生置身于良好的环境之中。我们同县委宣传部、妇联、关工委联合组 成了协调领导组,通过协调,共同努力,为优化社会环境、营造良好的教育氛围做了大量的具体工作。例如: 与县文化局一起狠抓了社会文化市场的清理整顿,依法查禁了一些宣扬色情迷信的书刊、音像制品。各校还开 辟了无神论教育校外活动基地,建立了军校、警校、厂(企)校联办的校外活动站320个,聘请校外辅导员417 人,定期开展活动,呈现了多方积极施教,共同优化育人环境的良好势头。

2.建立了学校、家庭、社会三结合教育网络

各校的三结合教育网络把无神论教育作为一项德育工作的主要内容去抓。利用各种形式,从学校、家庭到 社会开展无神论教育宣传,以产生合力的轰动效应。有的学校把无神论教育内容编成歌谣,组织学生到社会宣 传,有的学校利用家长学校举行无神论教育专题讲座。如双河镇长岗小学举行无神论教育家长座谈会,并邀请 部分退教的学生家长参加了会议,在座谈中,村民袁某介绍了自己因为有病,以为入教可以治病,入教二年多 ,初期由于精神好认为主能给我治病,病情有所减轻。后来病情严重,儿子强行给送进了医院,经过手术,病 才彻底好了。还有许多家长列举了受巫医大神欺骗的一些事实。学校又有针对性地宣传了有神论骗人的真实材 料。会后,这个村有10余人先后退出了宗教活动。

五里河镇教办向全镇中小学征文,搜集本地的真实事例,编写了《破除迷信,相信科学例话》,以当地的 活生生事实,揭穿了巫医大神骗人的伎俩和宗教虚幻的本质,这本小册子不仅发至教育内部,而且发至各村社 ,在社会上引起了强烈的反响。该镇党委宣传委员专程赶赴教育办说:“你们帮我们办了一件大事”。有的村 社,在制定村规民约时,加入了“不信迷信,信科学”的内容,使无神论教育从学校走向社会,形成了强大的 “三结合”教育攻势。

3.加强学校教育机制,变被动为主动

在无神论教育研究和开展教育活动中,学校是主阵地。如何把无神论教育纳入学校德育之中,加强其育人 功能,具体体现在课程化、时代化、艺术化和社会化四个方面。

课程化:就是通过课堂教学对学生进行知识传授和思想教育,达到文道结合。如小学的思想品德、中学的 政治、语文、史地等课,可以直接向学生进行无神论教育;有的学科需要教师动脑挖掘隐性教育因素,进行渗 透教育。就这个问题,我们与业务部门共同研究,在指导教师备课时,有目的、有计划地确定无神论教育与学 科知识教学的结合点,要求各校在学科教学中要加大无神论教育的力度。我们还通过无神论教育观摩教学,为 学科教学与渗透教育的结合引路,使无神论教育之水通过课堂教育之渠灌输给学生。我们明确要求,无论是德 育的显性课,还是德育的隐性课,都要组织教师认真挖掘知识点、教育点、结合教学内容,通过灌输、渗透、 疏导、迁移等方法,使“传道”融于“授业”之中,做到“有意”、“有机”、“有序”、“有情”地进行科 学无神论教育。

时代化、艺术化:就是把无神论教育寓于各项活动之中,体现改革开放的时代精神,开展形象的“活”的 教育。

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党课无神论篇3

  伦敦大学学院 (University College London),简称UCL,建校于1826年,位于英国伦敦,是一所世界著名的顶尖高等学府,为享有顶级声誉的综合研究型大学。立思辰青岛留学360宁懋龙老师介绍说,它是伦敦大学联盟(University of London,简称UOL)的创校学院,与剑桥大学、牛津大学、帝国理工学院、伦敦政治经济学院并称“G5超级精英大学”。

  时至今日,曾就读、任职于伦敦大学学院(UCL)的校友中,共有32位诺贝尔奖获得者和3位菲尔兹奖获得者,此外还不乏科学、政治以及文化等多个领域的名人。其中包括 “光纤之父” 高锟,“电话通讯之父”亚历山大·贝尔,DNA发现者“生物分子学之父”弗朗西斯·克里克,“建筑电讯派”核心彼得·库克,人工智能AlphaGo 算法的创建者戴密斯·哈萨比斯与大卫·席尔瓦,文学大师泰戈尔, 印度国父圣雄甘地和伊藤博文等。

  无神论学院

  立思辰青岛留学360宁懋龙老师介绍说,伦敦大学学院至今仍严格保留自身的非宗教色彩,并且是唯一没有设立祈祷间的英国大学。

  因此,UCL也被作高尔街上的无神论学院。不过学校里并没有对学生和教员宗教自由的限制,并且有一个安静的房间为所有不同信仰人士开放以便他用。UCL坚持世俗观念的初衷就是为了能使不同教派的学生们(例如天主教徒与新教徒)和睦相处,共同进步。 这项传统保留至今,使得UCL反映了民族和宗教上双重的多样和多重性。

  伦敦大学学院学生会也遵守此项政策,同时,实质上与任何政治团体保持距离,坚持自己的中立性。学生会职务的竞选者,不能参与任何政党的投票。立思辰广州留学360江兆果老师介绍说,这项规定可能归因于UCL多次重申的自身对政治漠不关心,这个特色和附近的学院例如伦敦政治经济学院(LSE)有明显差别,但这可能也是UCL自身学生团体或行政机构的政治倾向。 

党课无神论篇4

培根随笔论无神论主要内容50

【篇一:培根随笔论无神论主要内容50】

十六 论无神论

我宁愿相信《金传》,《塔尔木经》及可兰经中的一切寓言,而不愿相信这宇宙底体构是没有一个主宰的精神的。同此,上帝从没有创造奇迹以服无神论,因为神所造的日常的一切就足以驳倒无神论了。一点点儿哲学使人倾向于无神论,这是真的;但是深究哲理,使人心又转回到宗教去。因为当一个人底精神专注意许多不相联贯的次因的时候,那精神也许有时会停留在这些次因之中而不再前进;但是当它看见那一串的次因相连相系的时候,它就不能不飞向天与神了。不特此也,就是那最以无神论见诟的哲学学派(即莱欧西帕斯,德谟克瑞塔斯,埃辟寇拉斯一派)也最为证实宗教。因为主张这宇宙万物底秩序与美是不经一位神圣的领袖之主持而由四种可变易的原素和一种不可变易的第五原素,适如其分而永久如此地安排的,造成的,这种学说较之那主张这宇宙万物底秩序与美是全仗着一大群无限小,无定位的原子之说,其可信当在千倍也。

《圣经》上说:“愚顽人心里说没有神”但是并不曾说:“愚顽人心里想”;其意思就是这话是愚顽的人从着习惯给自己说了,以为是他愿意相信的,而并不是他能够完完全全地相信的。因为除了那些主张无神可以于自己有利的人们之外,没有人否认神底存在的。无神论者总在谈论他们底主张,好象他们自己心中觉得不甚妥实而乐意有别人底赞同来扶助自己似的,由此最可见无神论是口头上的而不是心里的。不特此也,谁都看得见无神论者努力吸收信徒,和别的宗教派别一样。并且,最要者,你还可以看见他们之中有些宁愿为无神论受刑而不愿反悔;然而如果他们真相信没有神这样东西,为什么他们要给自己找苦恼呢?埃辟寇拉斯曾说神明是有的,不过他们是逍遥自在,不问世事的。以此见责于世,以为他说这话的时候不过为了他底名誉的缘故而作伪罢了。人说他这话旨在骑墙;其实他心底里以为是没有神的。但是,无疑地,他这是受诽谤了,他底话是高贵而且虔诚的。“渎神之举不在否认世俗所谓的神灵,而在以世俗之见加之于神灵”。就是柏拉图也不能说得比这更好。

再者,埃辟寇拉斯虽然有胆量否认神底施为,却没有能力否认神底性质。西印度人有他们底各神底名字,却没有上帝底名字(就好象假设异教徒有久辟特、阿波罗、马斯等等名字而没有“神”之一字似的);这就足见甚至这些野蛮人也有关于神的观念,虽然这些观念是没有文明人关于神的观念之广大与一精一深的。因此,在反对无神论者这一宗事上,野蛮人和最深远的哲学家是在一起的。思想家的无神论者是很少的:一个戴俄高拉斯、一个巴昂、也许一个鲁先和其他的几位而已;然而就连他们也好象外表胜于实际,因为凡是对于既立的宗教或迷信倡异议的人总被反对者加以无神论者之名也。但是实实在在的无神论者乃是伪善者;他们老在搬弄神圣的东西而毫无所感;因此他们终久是要被炙的。无神论底原因是:宗教分成多派(因为任何分为主要的两大派是会增加人底热诚的;但是派别过多就要引起无神论了)。还有一个原因是僧侣底失德;就如圣波纳所说的情形一样:“我们现在不能说僧侣有如一般人,因为一般人现在是比僧侣强了”。第三个原因是一种亵渎和嘲弄神圣事物的风一习一 ,这种风一习一 一点一点地毁损了宗教底尊严。

最后还有一种理由,就是学术昌盛的时代,尤其是同时享有太平与繁荣的时代;因为祸乱与困厄较能使人心倾向宗教也。否认有神的人是毁灭人类底尊贵的;因为人类在肉体方面的确是与禽一兽 相近的;如果人类在精神方面再不与神相类的话,那末人就是一种卑污下贱的动物了。同样,无神论也毁灭英雄气概与人性底提高;如以一条狗为例,看他在发现自己受一个人底护持的时候显得是如何的高贵勇武,一个人对于他就是一位神灵,或者是一种更高的品性;这是由于那条狗对于一种较自己底天性更高的天性有信仰的原故。这种勇武显然是那个动物若无这种信仰则永不能达到的。人也是这样,当他信赖神灵底保护及恩惠,并以之自励的时候,就能聚积一种力量和信心来,这种力量和信心单凭人性底本身是得不到的。因此,无神论在一切的方面可恨,在这一方面也如此,就是它削夺了人性所赖以自拔于人类底弱点的助力。这在个人如此,在民族亦如此,从来没有一个国家有如罗马之壮伟者。关于这个国家且听西塞罗之所言:“无论我们自视多高,然而我们在人数上胜不过西班牙人,在体力上胜不过高尔人,在狡黠上胜不过迦太基人,在艺术上胜不过希腊人,并且在那些天生的,属于人民与土地的乡土之感上,连土著的意大利人和拉丁人也胜不过;然而在慈孝上,在宗教上,并且在那唯一的大智慧上——就是认明世间底一切是由众神底意志管理并支配的——在这些上我们是胜过一切的国家与民族的”。

【篇二:培根随笔论无神论主要内容50】

我宁愿相信圣使徒传、犹太经典和《古兰经》中的一切寓言和神话,也不能相信这宇宙是只有躯壳,却没有一个作为主宰的精神和灵魂。所以,上帝无须显示奇迹来反驳无神论。实际上,宇宙中所存在的自然秩序,已经足以驳倒它了。一知半解的哲学思考把人导向无神论,但是对宇宙与哲学的深刻思考,却必然使人皈依于上帝。因为只有从表面上看去,这自然界中的万物才是偶然和不相关联的。可是只要深入观察和思考,就会发现万物之间那些错综复杂的因果联系,最终只能导向一个总的宇宙原因——这就是神。正因为如此,恰是历史上那些最以无神论为标榜的哲学——例如卢克莱修、德谟克利特和伊壁鸠鲁的学说,倒恰恰提供了最有利于宗教哲学的证据,他们有两种学说。一种看法认为宇宙是由地(土)、水、风、火四大和“存在”这个范畴所构成。另一种看法则认为,宇宙万物的元素是一群无限小也无定形的原子。我认为在这两种说法中,以第一种较为可取。《圣经》中虽然说过:“愚者心目中看不见神。”但并没有说过:“愚者理性中认识不到神。”这就是说,愚人之所以主张无神的理论,只是因为他们的意见没有经过理性的思考。实际上,除非无神的理论可以给人以实际的好处,是没有人会认真地坚持无神论的。这一点还可以从以下两方面得到证明:尽管无神论者反对宗教,可是他们本身却也在传播一种宗教——这就是否认神的宗教。另一方面,许多无神论者为有人信仰神而痛苦、而争论——但既然根本没有神,你又何必还要为此而痛苦、而争辩呢?

其实伊壁鸠鲁曾说过,他认为神是存在的,只不过神并不愿干预和参与人间的生活就是了。当年他的这种见解曾受到猛烈的攻击。有神论者认为他这是狡猾地以这种对于神的虚伪看法,掩盖他内心中否认神的真是思想。我认为这些人倒是实在误解了伊壁鸠鲁,所以他们才如此诽谤他。其实,伊壁鸠鲁的话是非常高贵而真诚的,因为正是他说过这样一个格言:

“真正的亵渎神灵的,并不是那种否认世俗所见神灵的人,而是那些把世俗观念强加于神灵之上的人!”

这话实在太伟大了,就连柏拉图对于神也不可能讲得比这话更好。实际上,尽管伊壁鸠鲁否定神对世俗生活的参与,他却从没有否认过神作为宇宙本体的存在。

西方的印第安人虽然不认识上帝的存在,但他们也知道宇宙中存在神,并且赋予神以各种各样的名称。古代欧洲的异教徒们不也同样吗?他们不懂得上帝,但却崇拜丘皮特、阿波罗和宙斯。由此可见即使是未开化的野蛮人也具有关于神的观念,只是他们的宗教思想不如我们所认识的那样博大精深罢了。所以,就反驳无神论这一点而论,野蛮人是和最机智的哲学家站在一起的。而真正能提出理论的无神论者也并不多见。知名的只有迪格拉斯、拜思、卢西那么几个人。但他们的理论也都毫不严密,实际上只能算是一些怀疑论罢了。

真正的无神论者往往是虚伪的。他们一方面讨论神圣,另一方面又缺乏自知之明,所以他们早晚会碰壁。有利于无神论产生的因素有如下几种:一是宗教内部的派别纷争。二是教会内部的腐败。关于这一点,圣伯纳说过:“现在已不能说教士应当像普通人一样,因为现在普通人都比教士们强。”第三是亵渎和嘲弄神圣事物的风气。第四是由于天下太平安定,文化发达,就使人感到不需要再依赖神。假如人类陷于苦海的话,他们就会感到非常需要祈求神的帮助了。

在肉体方面,人类与野兽无异。如果在精神上再不追求神圣。那么人与禽兽就毫无区别。所以,无神论无益于人性的净化和升华。所有的动物,都需要借助一种信仰和崇拜才能提升自我的价值。就以狗来说,由于在它的眼中主人就是它的上帝,所以当需要时,它可以奋不顾身地为主人尽忠以至献身。人也是如此。当人心胸中具有一种神圣的理想和信仰,那么就可以激发出无限的意志和力量。这种意志和力量假如不依托一种信仰,就不可能产生。正因为如此,无神论是可憎的。人性本来是脆弱的,而无神论从根本上摧毁了人在内心中战胜邪恶的精神力量。不仅就个人而言是这样,就民族与国家而言也是如此。

在人类历史上,恐怕还从来没有任何国家比罗马更伟大。但是罗马之所以如此伟大,其原因西塞罗在一次对罗马人的演说中作过很精彩的论述。他是这样讲的:

“无论我们多么自豪,我们还是应该承认,我们在人数上少于西班牙人,在体质上弱于加洛人,在机敏上不如迦太基人,而在文化上则低于希腊人。而就爱国心和乡土观念论,我们也无法和本地那些土著人相比。但是我们有一点却越过了所有这些民族——就是我们的仁德、虔诚和对于神的信仰。我们确信我们来自于神,并且服从神意安排世界,就这一点而言,我们优越于世界上的任何人!”

|1楼2013-11-02 18:31

【篇三:培根随笔论无神论主要内容50】

读过《培根随笔集》的《论无神论者》一文,作者开宗便以极其自信的口吻和略带不屑的语调抨击了无神论者的无神论思想。首先,既然是写文章来表明观点的,就不要做出一副婆婆式的高高在上,你既然是不屑又何苦写文论证,自顾自的坚持自己的观点就是了,毋需表明。既然要写就要讲理,把姿态摆正,才能做到文字上的字正腔圆。

神与人的统治疆域是在不断变化的。在古代,越是无知,神的统治便越大,越是明理,人得统治便越大。在近代,越是祸乱,神的统治便越大,越是升平,人的统治便越大。在现代,越是苦恼,神的统治便越大,越是安乐,人的统治便越大。由此,不难看出,神统治无知,人在掌握有知。对无知的妄断,无益。对有知的体会,有益。崇拜源于无知和恐惧。

暂且抛开有神、无神不提。作者在原文中用西印度群岛蛮族的崇拜来印证自己的神论。图腾崇拜自古有之,有水有火有青铜有怪物异类。先民崇拜的缘由无非两种:一是此物带来灾祸,不能得罪要虔诚供奉,二是此物给人带来实惠,与人的生息繁衍和精神表述息息相关。无论是哪一种崇拜都是利己主义,不是清教徒不是苦行僧而是神为我用。

培根在文中抨击无神论者因为心虚所以才不厌其烦的宣扬自己的主张,颇有“桃李不言下自成蹊”的意味。诚如作者所说,那作者写《论无神论者》又是为何?以作者的观点,写《论无神论者》一文也是因为作者心虚了。真是以彼之矛,攻己之盾。

不信神,并非亵渎。亵渎在于把俗人之见加于神灵。从异端清洗到十字军东征直至黑暗的中世纪。多少妖言惑众之徒装神弄鬼,假神明之意,博一己私利。盘踞道义制高点,恣意妄为,不惜生灵涂炭祸国殃民。朝鲜的白内障患者重见光明,感谢的不是医生而是金胖子。这不是神之过,却祸起于斯。大到国家,小到个人,如果迷信盛行,形而上学就会停滞不前。所谓迷信便是热衷造神,双膝骨骼缺钙,跪地仰望强人。天有三宝,日月星。地有三宝,水火风。人有三宝,精气神。人有人的独到。

在原文中,作者认为无神论者毁掉人之高贵,人类会因无神成为低贱动物。并以狗举例说明,例说,有主人的狗有豪情和勇气,反之则无。我想说,人的高贵并非源自对神的崇拜,而是自身存在的思想。人也不需要有神这位主人而使自己耀威扬威,人有属于自己的尊严。有属于自己的“对月形单望相护,只羡鸳鸯不羡仙”。

党课无神论篇5




     (此文即是雪莱19岁时遭牛津开除之作)

       对真理的爱是促使作者写这篇短论的唯一动机。因此,如果有的读者发现作者在推理上有任何缺陷,或者能够提出作者的心灵永远发现不了的证据,作者恳切地请求他们以同样扼要、同样严格和同样坦率的方式,发表他们的论据以及反对意见。

       由于〔有神论的〕证据不足,本文作者是:一个无神论者。

       严密地检验支持任何命题的证明是否有效,是获得真理的唯一可靠方法;关于这种方法的优点,是不需要多说的。我们关于上帝存在的知识;是一个极其重要的论题;无论怎样细致的研究,也决不会是过分的。就是根据这一认识,我们现在扼要地、无所偏袒地考察一下那些已经提出了的证明。我们首先必须考虑什么是信仰的本质。

       当一个命题出现在心灵面前时,心灵就对构成这一命题的观念,产生同意或不同意的感觉。对于这些观念感到同意,就称为相信,有许多障碍往往阻止心灵产生这种直接的感觉;心灵就企图消除这类障碍,以便使这种感觉显得清晰。心灵为了对于构成命题的诸观念间的关系有完整的感觉,而对它们进行研究,这种研究是主动的;但是心灵对于这些观念间的关系的感觉,却是被动的。由于把心灵的这种研究和感觉混淆起来的缘故,就使许多人错误地以为心灵在信仰上是主动的,认为信仰是一种意志的活动,其结论就成为:信仰可以受心灵的制约。他们由于坚执着这种错误的观点,就进一步使不信仰带有一定程度的罪恶性质;但按不信仰的本质来说,是不可能带有罪恶性质的;它也同样不可能带有善的性质。因此,信仰是一种感情,这种感情的力量,就同其他各种感情一样,恰好同激动的程度成正比。

       激动的程度有三种。

       感觉是心灵获得一切知识的源泉;因而感觉的证据使人产生最强烈的同意。

       心灵的判断是建立在我们亲身经验的基础之上的,这种经验来自感觉的源泉;因此,根据经验的判断,在激动的程度上属于第二等。他人的经验,传达到我们的经验中,那就属于程度最低的一种(可以制订一种在程度上逐步增加的标尺,其上可以标明各种命题经受感觉考查的不同能力,命题的这种能力,将能准确地表明它们应该得到的信仰的程度。)

       因此,凡是有违理性的一切证明,都是不能接受的;因为理性就建立在感觉的证据上。

       每一种证明都可以被归人上述这三类中的一类;我们要考虑这三类的论据中,有哪一个论据足以说服我们相信上帝的存在。

       第一类,感觉上的证据。如果上帝能在我们面前现身,如果他能以他的存在来说服我们的感觉,这种启示就必然能造成信仰。如果神在哪些人面前出现过了,那么,这些人就可能具有对他的存在的最强烈的信念。但是神学家们的上帝是谁也看不见的。

       第二类,理性。不能不认为,人们都知道:一切现存之物必然有其起源,或者亘古即有之;人们也知道,凡不是亘古即有的事物,都必然有其产生的原因。当这种论点用到宇宙上去,就必须证明宇宙是被创造出来的;除非清楚地阐明我们可以合理地假定宇宙是无始无终的。我们必须首先证明有一个设计,然后才能推论出有这么一个设计者。唯一使我们可以形成因果关系的思想,来自事物间的经常联系,从一事物推出另一事物的关系。在两个命题正好相反的情况下,心灵就相信比较好理解的一个;与其认为宇宙之外另有一个存在,这个存在能够创造宇宙,还不如假定宇宙是无始无终的存在为易解。如果心灵已被一种担负压得够沉重的时候,再去增加不能忍受的重量,这会是一种缓解吗?

       另外一种论据是建立在人对其自身存在的知炽上的,大致如下:一个人不仅知道他现在存在,而且也知道他最初并不存在;因此,必然有其原因。但是,我们的因果观念只能来源于客观事物的恒常的联结,以及由此及彼的推理;而且,我们在实验地进行推理时,只能从结果推论出恰好适合于此种结果的那些原因。但是确有某种工具产生原动力,可是我们不能证明这种原动力是这些工具所固有的;相反的假设也同样没法阐明;我们承认这种原动力是不可理解的;但是如果假设这种结果是由一个永恒的、无处不在的、全能的存在所产生,也使原因变得同样模糊,而且使它更不好理解。

       第三类,见证。见证决不能违反理性。上帝使人的感觉相信他是存在的,关于这一点的见证,如果要人承认的话,除非我们的心灵认为这些见证人见到上帝的可能大于他们受骗的可能。我们的理性永不可能承认这样一些人的见证,他们不仅宣布他们是奇迹的目击者,并且也宣布上帝是非理性的;怎么说他们宣布上帝为非理性的?因为上帝指挥着,要人们相信他,谁相信他,他就给谁以最高的奖赏,谁不信他,就永世受罚。我们只能指挥有意识的行动;但信仰并非有意识的行动;心灵是被动的,或者说无意识地主动的:由此可见,我们没有足够的证据,或者不如说,要证明上帝的存在,证据不足。我们在上文已表明,从理性不能演绎出这种结论。只有那些被感觉的证据所说服的人们,才能相信其存在。

       因此,很显然,从这三类信仰的源泉都得到证明,心灵不能相信有一个创造一切的上帝的存在。同样明显的是,信仰既然是一种心灵的感情,对于不信者,即无罪恶可言;只有那些不愿消除错误观点,始终从这种观点来看待任何论题的人,才是不可恕的。每一颗能思考的心灵,必然承认关于上帝的存在世上没有任何证明。

       上帝只是一个假设,作为一个假设,因此需要证明。“有责证明”(musprobandi),对有神论者们来说。艾萨克·牛顿爵士说:“我从来也不作假设,因为任何不是从现象中演绎出来的东西,都必须被称为‘假设’;凡是假设,不论是形而上学的假设,物理学的假设,或带有神秘性质的假设,甚而至于力学上的假设——从哲学上说来;统统都是不值一钱的。” 牛顿的这一条有价值的法则,也适合于一切关于创造主的存在的证明。我们看到具有各种力量的各种物体,我们仅仅知道它们的效果;关于它们的本质和原因,我们处于一种无知的状态。牛顿称这些为事物的现象;但是哲学的骄做不愿意承认哲学自己对于这些事物的原因无知。从我们的感觉对象——这些现象,我们企图推出原因,这个原因我们称之为上帝,又无谓地赠给他各种否定的和矛盾的性质。从这个假设出发,我们发明了这个总的名称〔上帝〕,来掩饰我们对原因和本质的无知。被称为上帝的这个存在,根本不符合牛顿所开列的条件;上帝却带有哲学自大狂所织成的帷幕的一切特征,这片帷幕被哲学家们用来甚至让他们自己看不到自己的无知。他们从庸人们的“神人同形同性论”中借取了纺织这片帷幕所需的纱线。诡辩家们为了同样目的,使用了种种的字眼:从逍遥学派的神秘性概念,以至于波义尔的“媒素”(effluvium)和赫歇耳(Herschel)的“克里尼底”(Crinities)或“星云”。上帝被说成是无限的、永恒的、不可理解的;他被放在无知的逻辑所能编造的每一个“predicateinnon”
(虚无的谓词)之中。甚至连他的崇拜者们也都承认,要形成任何关于他的观念是不可能的。他们学着一位法国诗人那样喊道:

       “要说出他是什么,只有他自己才能够。”

       培根爵士说,无神论给人们带来理性、哲学、自然崇拜、法律、荣誉,以及能够引导人们走向道德的一切事物;但是迷信破坏这一切,并且把自身建立为一种暴君统治,压在人类的悟性之上。因此,无神论决不会破坏政治,而只会使人们的眼睛更亮,因为他们能看到在现世的界线之外是什么东西也没有的。(见培根道德论文。)

       Q.E.D.(证毕)


——————————————————————————————————————————



The Necessity Of Atheism


[NOTE -- The Necessity of Atheism was published by Shelley in 1811. In 1813 he printed a revised and expanded version of it as one of the notes to his poem Queen Mab. The revised and expanded version is the one here reprinted.]

There Is No God
This negation must be understood solely to affect a creative Deity. The hypothesis of a pervading Spirit co-eternal with the universe remains unshaken.

A close examination of the validity of the proofs adduced to support any proposition is the only secure way of attaining truth, on the advantages of which it is unnecessary to descant: our knowledge of the existence, of a Deity is a subject of such importance that it cannot be too minutely investigated; in consequence of this conviction we proceed briefly and impartially to examine the proofs which have been adduced. It is necessary first to consider the nature of belief.

When a proposition is offered to the mind, It perceives the agreement or disagreement of the ideas of which it is composed. A perception of their agreement is termed belief. Many obstacles frequently prevent this perception from being immediate; these the mind attempts to remove in order that the perception may be distinct. The mind is active in the investigation in order to perfect the state of perception of the relation which the component ideas of the proposition bear to each, which is passive; the investigation being confused with the perception has induced many falsely to imagine that the mind is active in belief. -- that belief is an act of volition, -- in consequence of which it may be regulated by the mind. Pursuing, continuing this mistake, they have attached a degree of criminality to disbelief; of which, in its nature, it is incapable: it is equally incapable of merit.

Belief, then, is a passion, the strength of which, like every other passion, is in precise proportion to the degrees of excitement.

The degrees of excitement are three.

The senses are the sources of all knowledge to the mind; consequently their evidence claims the strongest assent.

The decision of the mind, founded upon our own experience, derived from these sources, claims the next degree.

The experience of others, which addresses itself to the former one, occupies the lowest degree.

(A graduated scale, on which should be marked the capabilities of propositions to approach to the test of the senses, would be a just barometer of the belief which ought to be attached to them.)

Consequently no testimony can be admitted which is contrary to reason; reason is founded on the evidence of our senses.

Every proof may be referred to one of these three divisions: it is to be considered what arguments we receive from each of them, which should convince us of the existence of a Deity.

1st, The evidence of the senses. If the Deity should appear to us, if he should convince our senses of his existence, this revelation would necessarily command belief. Those to whom the Deity has thus appeared have the strongest possible conviction of his existence. But the God of Theologians is incapable of local visibility.

2d, Reason. It is urged that man knows that whatever is must either have had a beginning, or have existed from all eternity, he also knows that whatever is not eternal must have had a cause. When this reasoning is applied to the universe, it is necessary to prove that it was created: until that is clearly demonstrated we may reasonably suppose that it has endured from all eternity. We must prove design before we can infer a designer. The only idea which we can form of causation is derivable from the constant conjunction of objects, and the consequent inference of one from the other. In a base where two propositions are diametrically opposite, the mind believes that which is least incomprehensible; -- it is easier to suppose that the universe has existed from all eternity than to conceive a being beyond its limits capable of creating it: if the mind sinks beneath the weight of one, is it an alleviation to increase the intolerability of the burthen?

The other argument, which is founded on a Man"s knowledge of his own existence, stands thus. A man knows not only that he now is, but that once he was not; consequently there must have been a cause. But our idea of causation is alone derivable from the constant conjunction of objects and the consequent Inference of one from the other; and, reasoning experimentally, we can only infer from effects caused adequate to those effects. But there certainly is a generative power which is effected by certain instruments: we cannot prove that it is inherent in these instruments" nor is the contrary hypothesis capable of demonstration: we admit that the generative power is incomprehensible; but to suppose that the same effect is produced by an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent being leaves the cause in the same obscurity, but renders it more incomprehensible.

3d, Testimony. It is required that testimony should not be contrary to reason. The testimony that the Deity convinces the senses of men of his existence can only be admitted by us, if our mind considers it less probable, that these men should have been deceived than that the Deity should have appeared to them. Our reason can never admit the testimony of men, who not only declare that they were eye-witnesses of miracles, but that the Deity was irrational; for he commanded that he should be believed, he proposed the highest rewards for, faith, eternal punishments for disbelief. We can only command voluntary actions; belief is not an act of volition; the mind is ever passive, or involuntarily active; from this it is evident that we have no sufficient testimony, or rather that testimony is insufficient to prove the being of a God. It has been before shown that it cannot be deduced from reason. They alone, then, who have been convinced by the evidence of the senses can believe it.

Hence it is evident that, having no proofs from either of the three sources of conviction, the mind cannot believe the existence of a creative God: it is also evident that, as belief is a passion of the mind, no degree of criminality is attachable to disbelief; and that they only are reprehensible who neglect to remove the false medium through which their mind views any subject of discussion. Every reflecting mind must acknowledge that there is no proof of the existence of a Deity.

God is an hypothesis, and, as such, stands in need of proof: the onus probandi rests on the theist. Sir Isaac Newton says: Hypotheses non fingo, quicquid enim ex phaenomenis non deducitur hypothesis, vocanda est, et hypothesis vel metaphysicae, vel physicae, vel qualitatum occultarum, seu mechanicae, in philosophia locum non habent. To all proofs of the existence of a creative God apply this valuable rule. We see a variety of bodies possessing a variety of powers: we merely know their effects; we are in a estate of ignorance with respect to their essences and causes. These Newton calls the phenomena of things; but the pride of philosophy is unwilling to admit its ignorance of their causes. From the phenomena, which are the objects of our attempt to infer a cause, which we call God, and gratuitously endow it with all negative and contradictory qualities. From this hypothesis we invent this general name, to conceal our ignorance of causes and essences. The being called God by no means answers with the conditions prescribed by Newton; it bears every mark of a veil woven by philosophical conceit, to hide the ignorance of philosophers even from themselves. They borrow the threads of its texture from the anthropomorphism of the vulgar. Words have been used by sophists for the same purposes, from the occult qualities of the peripatetics to the effuvium of Boyle and the crinities or nebulae of Herschel. God is represented as infinite, eternal, incomprehensible; he is contained under every predicate in non that the logic of ignorance could fabricate. Even his worshippers allow that it is impossible to form any idea of him: they exclaim with the French poet,

Pour dire ce qu"il est, il faut etre lui-meme.

Lord Bacon says that atheism leaves to man reason, philosophy, natural piety, laws, reputation, and everything that can serve to conduct him to virtue; but superstition destroys all these, and erects itself into a tyranny over the understandings of men: hence atheism never disturbs the government, but renders man more clear- sighted, since he sees nothing beyond the boundaries of the present life. -- Bacon"s Moral Essays.

The [Beginning here, and to the paragraph ending with Systeme de la Nature," Shelley wrote in French. A free translation has been substituted.] first theology of man made him first fear and adore the elements themselves, the gross and material objects of nature; he next paid homage to the agents controlling the elements, lower genies, heroes or men gifted with great qualities. By force of reflection he sought to simplify things by submitting all nature to a single agent, spirit, or universal soul, which, gave movement to nature and all its branches. Mounting from cause to cause, mortal man has ended by seeing nothing; and it is in this obscurity that he has placed his God; it is in this darksome abyss that his uneasy imagination has always labored to fabricate chimeras, which will continue to afflict him until his knowledge of nature chases these phantoms which he has always so adored.

If we wish to explain our ideas of the Divinity we shall be obliged to admit that, by the word God, man has never been able to designate but the most hidden, the most distant and the most unknown cause of the effects which he saw; he has made use of his word only when the play of natural and known causes ceased to be visible to him; as soon as he lost the thread of these causes, or when his mind could no longer follow the chain, he cut the difficulty and ended his researches by calling God the last of the causes, that is to say, that which is beyond all causes that he knew; thus he but assigned a vague denomination to an unknown cause, at which his laziness or the limits of his knowledge forced him to stop. Every time we say that God is the author of some phenomenon, that signifies that we are ignorant of how such a phenomenon was able to operate by the aid of forces or causes that we know in nature. It is thus that the generality of mankind, whose lot is ignorance, attributes to the Divinity, not only the unusual effects which strike them, but moreover the most simple events, of which the causes are the most simple to understand by whomever is able to study them. In a word, man has always respected unknown causes, surprising effects that his ignorance kept him from unraveling. It was on this debris of nature that man raised the imaginary colossus of the Divinity.

If ignorance of nature gave birth to gods, knowledge of nature is made for their destruction. In proportion as man taught himself, his strength and his resources augmented with his knowledge; science, the arts, industry, furnished him assistance; experience reassured him or procured for him means of resistance to the efforts of many causes which ceased to alarm as soon as they became understood. In a word, his terrors dissipated in the same proportion as his mind became enlightened. The educated man ceases to be superstitious.

It is only by hearsay (by word of mouth passed down from generation to generation) that whole peoples adore the God of their fathers and of their priests: authority, confidence, submission and custom with them take the place of conviction or of proofs: they prostrate themselves and pray, because their fathers taught them to prostrate themselves and pray: but why did their fathers fall on their knees? That is because, in primitive times, their legislators and their guides made it their duty. "Adore and believe," they said, "the gods whom you cannot understand; have confidence in our profound wisdom; we know more than you about Divinity." But why should I come to you? It is because God willed it thus; it is because God will punish you if you dare resist. But this God, is not he, then, the thing in question? However, man has always traveled in this vicious circle; his slothful mind has always made him find it easier to accept the judgment of others. All religious nations are founded solely on authority; all the religions of the world forbid examination and do not want one to reason; authority wants one to believe in God; this God is himself founded only on the authority of a few men who pretend to know him, and to come in his name and announce him on earth. A God made by man undoubtedly has need of man to make himself known to man.

Should it not, then, be for the priests, the inspired, the metaphysicians that should be reserved the conviction of the existence of a God, which they, nevertheless, say is so necessary for all mankind? But Can you find any harmony in the theological opinions of the different inspired ones or thinkers scattered over the earth? They themselves, who make a profession of adoring the same God, are they in Agreement? Are they content with the proofs that their colleagues bring of his existence? Do they subscribe unanimously to the ideas they present on nature, on his conduct, on the manner of understanding his pretended oracles? Is there a country on earth where the science of God is really perfect? Has this science anywhere taken the consistency and uniformity that we the see the science of man assume, even in the most futile crafts, the most despised trades. These words mind immateriality, creation, predestination and grace; this mass of subtle distinctions with which theology to everywhere filled; these so ingenious inventions, imagined by thinkers who have succeeded one another for so many centuries, have only, alas! confused things all the more, and never has man"s most necessary science, up to this time acquired the slightest fixity. For thousands of years the lazy dreamers have perpetually relieved one another to meditate on the Divinity, to divine his secret will, to invent the proper hypothesis to develop this important enigma. Their slight success has not discouraged the theological vanity: one always speaks of God: one has his throat cut for God: and this sublime being still remains the most unknown and the most discussed.

Man would have been too happy, if, limiting himself to the visible objects which interested him, he had employed, to perfect his real sciences, his laws, his morals, his education, one-half the efforts he has put into his researches on the Divinity. He would have been still wiser and still more fortunate if he had been satisfied to let his jobless guides quarrel among themselves, sounding depths capable of rendering them dizzy, without himself mixing in their senseless disputes. But it is the essence of ignorance to attach importance to that which it does not understand. Human vanity is so constituted that it stiffens before difficulties. The more an object conceals itself from our eyes, the greater the effort we make to seize it, because it pricks our pride, it excites our curiosity and it appears interesting. In fighting for his God everyone, in fact, fights only for the interests of his own vanity, which, of all the passions produced by the mal-organization of society, is the quickest to take offense, and the most capable of committing the greatest follies.

If, leaving for a moment the annoying idea that theology gives of a capricious God, whose partial and despotic decrees decide the fate of mankind, we wish to fix our eyes only on the pretended goodness, which all men, even trembling before this God, agree is ascribing to him, if we allow him the purpose that is lent him of having worked only for his own glory, of exacting the homage of intelligent beings; of seeking only in his works the well-being of mankind; how reconcile these views and these dispositions with the ignorance truly invincible in which this God, so glorious and so good, leaves the majority of mankind in regard to God himself? If God wishes to be known, cherished, thanked, why does he not show himself under his favorable features to all these intelligent beings by whom he wishes to be loved and adored? Why not manifest himself to the whole earth in an unequivocal manner, much more capable of convincing us than these private revelations which seem to accuse the Divinity of an annoying partiality for some of his creatures? The all-powerful, should he not heave more convincing means by which to show man than these ridiculous metamorphoses, these pretended incarnations, which are attested by writers so little in agreement among themselves? In place of so many miracles, invented to prove the divine mission of so many legislators revered by the different people of the world, the Sovereign of these spirits, could he not convince the human mind in an instant of the things he wished to make known to it? Instead of hanging the sun in the vault of the firmament, instead of scattering stars without order, and the constellations which fill space, would it not have been more in conformity with the views of a God so jealous of his glory and so well-intentioned for mankind, to write, in a manner not subject to dispute, his name, his attributes, his permanent wishes in ineffaceable characters, equally understandable to all the inhabitants of the earth? No one would then be able to doubt the existence of God, of his clear will, of his visible intentions. Under the eyes of this so terrible God no one would have the audacity to violate his commands, no mortal would dare risk attracting his anger: finally, no man would have the effrontery to impose on his name or to interpret his will according to his own fancy.

In fact, even while admitting the existence of the theological God, and the reality of his so discordant attributes which they impute to him, one can conclude nothing to authorize the conduct or the cult which one is prescribed to render him. Theology is truly the sieve of the Danaides. By dint of contradictory qualities and hazarded assertions it has, that is to say, so handicapped its God that it has made it impossible for him to act. If he is infinitely good, what reason should we have to fear him? If he is infinitely wise, why should we have doubts concerning our future? If he knows all, why warn him of our needs and fatigue him with our prayers? If he is everywhere, why erect temples to him? If he is just, why fear that he will punish the creatures that he has, filled with weaknesses? If grace does everything for them, what reason would he have for recompensing them? If he is all-powerful, how offend him, how resist him? If he is reasonable, how can he be angry at the blind, to whom he has given the liberty of being unreasonable? If he is immovable, by what right do we pretend to make him change his decrees? If he is inconceivable, why occupy ourselves with him? IF HE HAS SPOKEN, WHY IS THE UNIVERSE NOT CONVINCED? If the knowledge of a God is the most necessary, why is it not the most evident and the clearest. -- Systame de la Nature. London, 1781.

The enlightened and benevolent Pliny thus Publicly professes himself an atheist, -- Quapropter effigiem Del formamque quaerere imbecillitatis humanae reor. Quisquis est Deus (si modo est alius) et quacunque in parte, totus est gensus, totus est visus, totus auditus, totus animae, totus animi, totus sul. ... Imperfectae vero in homine naturae praecipua solatia, ne deum quidem omnia. Namque nec sibi protest mortem consciscere, si velit, quod homini dedit optimum in tantis vitae poenis; nee mortales aeternitate donare, aut revocare defunctos; nec facere ut qui vixit non vixerit, qui honores gessit non gesserit, nullumque habere In praeteritum ius praeterquam oblivionts, atque (ut. facetis quoque argumentis societas haec cum, deo compuletur) ut bis dena viginti non sint, et multa similiter efficere non posse. -- Per quaedeclaratur haud dubie naturae potentiam id quoque ease quod Deum vocamus. -- Plin. Nat. Hist. cap. de Deo.

The consistent Newtonian is necessarily an atheist. See Sir W. Drummond"s Academical Questions, chap. iii. -- Sir W. seems to consider the atheism to which it leads as a sufficient presumption of the falsehood of the system of gravitation; but surely it is more consistent with the good faith of philosophy to admit a deduction from facts than an hypothesis incapable of proof, although it might militate, with the obstinate preconceptions of the mob. Had this author, instead of inveighing against the guilt and absurdity of atheism, demonstrated its falsehood, his conduct would have, been more suited to the modesty of the skeptic and the toleration of the philosopher.

Omnia enim per Dei potentiam facta aunt: imo quia naturae potentia nulla est nisi ipsa Dei potentia. Certum est nos eatenus Dei potentiam non intelligere, quatenus causas naturales ignoramus; adeoque stulte ad eandem Dei potentism recurritur, quando rei alicuius causam naturalem, sive est, ipsam Dei potentiam ignoramusd -- Spinoza, Tract. Theologico-Pol. chap 1. P. 14.

党课无神论篇6

当前青少年科学无神论教育的现状与建议

作者:《青少年科学无神论教育现状调查》课题组

作者机构:无

来源:科学与无神论

ISSN:1008-9802

年:2004

卷:000

期:004

页码:35-36

页数:2

正文语种:chi

摘要:@@ 一、问题提出rn2001年1月23日,在天安门广场发生的"***"痴迷者集体自焚惨剧,在7个自焚的痴迷者当中竟有19岁的女大学生和12岁的小学生成了邪教的牺牲品.这从反面警示我们必须坚决保护我国青少年免受邪教的精神控制和肉体摧残.为了准确了解当前青少年科学无神论教育的状况,2003年4月由北京市科协和北京反邪教协会软科学研究基金资助,我们对北京市城、近、郊区的中学生和中学教师进行了抽样问卷调查,调查的内容分为神秘类图书问题、鬼神迷信问题、星相算命问题、神秘现象问题四类20(学生)个问题(教师问卷为24个问题).发放问卷222份,回收有效问卷217份.

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